The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport’s Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board (ARAIB) announced the results of an investigation into a collision accident involving a maintenance train that occurred at Guro Station on the Gyeongbu Line last August. The accident resulted in the deaths of two workers and injuries to one. The investigation identified the causes as “intrusion of the work platform onto the track” and “inadequate operational management systems.” The ARAIB recommended three safety measures for Korea Railroad Corporation (Korail) to address these issues.
The accident occurred on track 9 at Guro Station during an inspection of electrical facilities using an electric motor car. Workers extended the work platform approximately 1.8 meters toward the 10th track direction without prior approval, to replace an insulator. At that time, a track inspection car returning to Seoul Station entered the 10th track at about 85 km/h and struck the work platform.
The train operator saw the platform about 20 meters ahead and attempted to stop, but there was not enough time and distance to avoid the collision. The ARAIB analyzed that the direct cause of the accident was the work platform encroaching on the neighboring track’s operating protection zone.
A significant factor highlighted was the lack of an operational management system that could adequately control work and train operations on tracks 10 and 11, or the respective lines. There was insufficient planning and coordination for railroad operation safety, and temporary operational orders were not registered in the system, leading to the use of communication devices that did not incorporate temporary train operation plans.
The ARAIB’s recommendations for Korail include strengthening safety measures for overhead lines and tracks, improving station section operational controls, and enhancing train operation management. It emphasized the need to clearly document and approve work content and areas, strictly implement safety consultations, and pre-confirm operational orders and temporary plans to minimize recurrence risks.
Furthermore, improvements are needed for operational controls and boundary management on Guro Station’s tracks 10 and 11. It suggested clarifying the supervising entities in ambiguous control areas and installing boundary markers to prevent collisions with moving trains during work.
Additionally, it called for improved communication systems and reporting procedures between operators and work supervisors to ensure train operation information is promptly shared with workers.
The ARAIB plans to monitor the implementation of these recommendations, continuing efforts to prevent similar accidents and strengthen management systems. The full report was made available on the ARAIB website at 11 a.m. on the 18th.