‘Control tower of the sea’ the Maritime Traffic Control Center (VTS)
Failed to detect abnormal signs in the Shinan passenger ship grounding
Broader control areas per controller than during Sewol Ferry disaster
“Limitations in minute-by-minute control within the managed area”
No alarm from VTS when the passenger ship approached Jukdo
“Alarms went off frequently, so we usually turned them off” testimony reveals
On the 20th, the Mokpo Coastal Police and National Forensic Service investigators conducted an investigation on the collision site regarding the grounding incident involving the Queen Zenubia 2 ferry at the Samhak Passenger Ship Terminal in Mokpo, Jeonnam. The maritime police are investigating why the VTS failed to detect any abnormal signs before the Queen Zenubia 2 ferry grounded, despite being the “control tower of the sea.” It’s been revealed that the area each VTS controller is responsible for has expanded since the Sewol Ferry disaster in 2014. There is a call to examine vulnerabilities in the overall control system, including workload and equipment utilization, beyond simply determining controller negligence.
● One person monitoring an area the size of Seongnam City
According to the Mokpo Maritime Police Station, the Queen Zenubia 2 ferry deviated approximately 1.6 km from its usual route at around 8:13 p.m. on the 19th and collided with Jukdo in Jangsan-myeon, Shinan-gun, at 8:16 p.m., three minutes later. The responsible Mokpo VTS controller did not issue a warning and was only aware of the situation after a report from the first mate following the grounding. This has led to criticism that the VTS failed to fulfill its role of warning ships of route deviations and collision risks.
The maritime police are investigating based on the affidavit from the responsible controller, who stated they were focused on another ship that had already deviated from its course during the accident. Mokpo VTS is equipped with radar that alerts when ships approach within 300 meters of Jukdo, but it is being examined why it didn’t function. The Mokpo VTS reportedly testified that alerts frequently went off for small ships without navigation obligations, which disrupted normal control, so they were usually turned off.
However, there is counterargument among controllers that “the situation exceeds what one person can manage.” The control range of Mokpo VTS spans 352 km² from Jindo to Mokpo with an average of 260 ships traveling daily. Sector 3, where the accident occurred, is 147.2 km², larger than Seongnam City (141 km²). Two controllers manage this sector alternately every 1 hour and 30 minutes, hence the structure where one person is responsible for an area larger than Seongnam City.
● The area per controller increased 1.3 times after the Sewol Ferry disaster
The reason the area per controller is so vast is due to the expansion of surveillance scope by the government since the Sewol Ferry disaster. The national VTS control area increased from 19,336 km² in November 2014 to 43,908 km² currently, a 2.3-fold increase. However, during the same period, the number of controllers increased only 1.8 times from 347 to 611. Consequently, the average area managed per controller increased from 55.7 km² to 71.9 km², a 1.3-fold increase.
Controllers lament the limitations in minute-by-minute control of all situations within their area. Observing dozens of ships entangled and moving without signals, with rapidly changing currents at sea, requires intense concentration.
According to the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA), at least 9.4 controllers are needed per control desk, but Mokpo VTS operates with about 6. The Korea Maritime Institute criticized that expanding surveillance areas without increasing control personnel imposes excessive workloads, critically affecting maritime traffic safety roles. Kuk Seung-ki, a professor at the Korea Maritime and Ocean University’s Department of Maritime Police, suggested measures such as designating focused watch areas or upgrading equipment to reduce controller fatigue, pointing out that Korea’s VTS jurisdiction is abnormally broad.
● Arrest warrant for captain who left the steering room
Meanwhile, on the 23rd, the maritime police applied for an arrest warrant for Kim, the captain of Queen Zenubia 2, on charges of gross negligence and violation of the Seafarers Act. Kim is suspected of violating the law, which requires directly commanding ship navigation in narrow waterways like the accident site. The maritime police are investigating whether Kim’s habitual absence from the steering room contributed to the accident, as it was found that he never commanded navigation from the steering room while transiting narrow areas over the past two years.
Earlier, first mate Park (40) and Indonesian helmsman (41), already arrested on charges of gross negligence, claimed to have been looking at their mobile phone and electronic compass, respectively, during the accident.